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Abstract 
This paper seeks to contribute to the growing literature on pragmatism in political 
theory by revisiting the role of moral absolutes in politics. More specifically, I 
propose the idea that pragmatism can support a particular defence of the ban on 
torture. In contradistinction with deontological accounts, I will argue that the 
principles underlying the ban on torture should not be construed as transcendental 
values that impose external constraints on political action, but as constitutive rules 
that emerge from, and are sustained by, a web of intersecting social practices. While 
pragmatists vehemently reject the introduction of absolutes in politics, their anti-
foundationalist conception of reasoning crucially hinges on the sustainability of 
adjustable banisters along which judgments are formed. The paper suggests that the 
torture prohibition ought to be re-interpreted as one such banister. 
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I. Introduction2 
Over the past 10 years, the reception of pragmatist themes in political theory has been 
steadily increasing. This paper seeks to contribute to the growing literature by 
examining the role of moral absolutes in politics from a pragmatist perspective. Its 
main purpose is to contribute to a better understanding of pragmatism via an 
exploration of recent controversies around torture as a case study. 
Can one be a pragmatist about torture without becoming pragmatic about it? Can one 
cultivate a fallibilistic mentality with regard to all deliberative processes without 
endorsing the position of those who invoke the “ticking-bomb scenario”, advocating 
that sometimes torturing a suspect is simply the lesser evil? This paper will answer in 
the positive. In doing so, I demonstrate that pragmatism’s reluctance to permit moral 
absolutes in the political forum should not be equated with an acquiescent attitude 
towards torture. While pragmatism cannot support an absolute ban on torture, it may 
furnish a contingent argument for such a ban that is of considerable strength. 
As I shall maintain, pragmatists are correct in stressing the dangers of absolutes in 
politics; yet, their fallibilistic mentality regarding all processes of reflection and 
deliberation commits them also to endorsing relatively, not absolutely, firm principles 
of social and political organization. The paper hence extends an invitation to envisage 
the torture prohibition not as a transcendental norm that imposes external constraints 
on the behaviour of individual or collective agents, but rather as a constitutive rule of 
reasoning, emerging from, and sustained by, an intersecting web of social practices. 
The majority of those who have grappled with torture apologists invoke inviolable 
goods, such as human dignity, in order to undermine the utilitarian calculus set into 
motion by thought experiments, like the “ticking-bomb scenario” (for an alternative, 
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virtue-ethical rebuttal of torture apologists see: Gordon, 2014). Whether they 
subscribe to a Kantian system of secular morality (Habermas, 2010), or to a 
religiously inspired code of ethics (Luban, 2009), these champions of an absolute ban 
on torture claim that not even the highest ends (such as saving the innocent) license 
the use of all means (such as torturing the suspect). 
These attempts to respond to the consequentialist challenge have been fruitful in 
many respects, and I do not intend to detract from their accomplishments. However, 
the initial intuition behind this paper is that deontological accounts are likely to run 
into serious problems once they confront consequentialists on their own playing field. 
Instead of accepting the challenge on the terms set by consequentialists, the 
suggestion is to shift the debate towards examining what is actually at stake with the 
torture debates. To motivate this shift in attention is the paper’s ambition. 
In the following, I pursue two more specific goals: (1) I aim to construct an argument 
for the ban on torture from pragmatist premises. In working through the controversy 
around the prohibition, focusing in particular on the ticking-bomb scenario, the paper 
therefore hopes to push the boundaries of what political theorists in the pragmatist 
tradition feel confident engaging with. While recent discussions have mostly revolved 
around pragmatism’s potential to renew democracy (Talisse, 2014), it is perhaps time 
to expand the horizon of problematizations and study in which other areas of 
normative political theory it can be put to use.  
(2) Simultaneously, the paper seeks to outline a defence of the torture prohibition that 
is based on the notion of “constitutive rules of reasoning”, developed through an 
engagement with Robert Brandom’s work. It hence proffers a justification for the ban 
that is not grounded in some form of deontology, but rather in the social practices 
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shared by a community of reasoners. In this sense, the second goal of the paper is 
decidedly revisionist – it strives to shift the academic debate towards a new way of 
seeing the ban on torture as a constitutive element of liberal democracy. 
The argument proceeds as follows. Section II presents a first version of the pragmatist 
case against moral absolutism. In concentrating on the work of Richard Bernstein, I 
single out one author who has highlighted the detrimental effects absolutes can have 
on public deliberations. I also point to some inherent issues with the wholesale 
rejection of absolutes. Section III then gives an account of recent debates around 
torture in normative political theory. I will rehearse these debates by foregrounding 
the divide between absolutist and consequentialist positions and by scrutinizing a 
recent taxonomy of how absolutes function. Finally, section IV probes the pragmatist 
tradition’s potential to oppose torture. The main source of inspiration for this section 
will be Brandom’s account of reasoning as a social activity. 
This introduction cannot end without a caveat about the essay’s limitations: since my 
main goal is to widen the scope of pragmatism, much interpretive energy will be 
dedicated to close readings of authors within this tradition. As a consequence, the 
examination of the post-9/11 torture debates will, by necessity, have to remain 
limited, concentrating entirely on questions of justification and leaving aside several 
significant issues, such as the psychological and somatic trauma suffered by torture 
victims (Campbell, 2007; Mollica, 2004), or the historical transformations of torture 
as a tool of interrogation (Langbein, 1977). Obviously, I do not wish to suggest that 
these issues are irrelevant for the topic under scrutiny here; a holistic approach to the 
phenomenon of torture would certainly have to pay close attention to all these 
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dimensions. However, since such a broad approach cannot be realized in one essay 
alone, I will confine myself here to exclusively discussing the ticking-bomb scenario. 
II. The Prima Facie Case against Moral Absolutes 
Before turning to the pragmatist case against moral absolutes, a number of 
preliminary clarifications seem necessary. When referring to pragmatism as a set of 
philosophical ideas, it is vital to stress that it would be misleading to celebrate a 
“revival” of pragmatism in our days. The revival narrative is premised on the idea that 
classical pragmatism had been fully eclipsed by 20th Century analytical philosophy. 
(Talisse and Aikin, 2011) Recent scholarship, though, has stressed that this image is 
largely overdrawn. It has also been argued that referring to “pragmatism” in an 
unspecified manner is rather futile: neither did the “founding fathers” of pragmatism – 
William James, Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey – share a whole lot of 
common ground, nor can it be said that recent appropriations of traditional themes 
consistently follow the same lines of exegesis. (Talisse, 2007, p. 21) 
But internal strife should not distract us from isolating family resemblances, a 
unifying ethos, between otherwise disagreeing pragmatists. (Bernstein, 1989) Let us 
highlight three elementary views to which all pragmatists appear to be committed 
(Knight and Johnson, 2011, pp. 26–28): (1) pragmatists endorse fallibilism, that is, the 
idea that all opinions are in principle open to revision and critique. No matter how 
deeply held a conviction is, pragmatists submit that any belief could and should be 
changed in view of new deliberations and reflections; (2) at the same time, 
pragmatists embrace anti-scepticism, in the sense that doubt can never be all-
embracing. It is impossible, on a pragmatist account, to question all beliefs at once; 
and (3) pragmatists are consequentialists in the general sense of looking at the real 
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effects ideas have on our actions.3 Thus, they believe that “practice is primary in 
philosophy” (Putnam, 1994, p. 152).  
With this broad picture in mind, I now want to concentrate on one contemporary 
author: Richard Bernstein. (see representatively: 1992, 2010, 2013) his discussion of 
absolutes is not persuasive on all accounts, as shall become clear towards the end of 
this section, it opens up an interesting perspective that will help us shed light on the 
torture prohibition. Bernstein attacks what Dewey called the “quest for certainty” 
(Dewey, 1998): 
Dewey understood that at times of deep uncertainty, anxiety, and fear, there is 
a craving for moral certainty and absolutes. At such times there can be a 
desperate search for metaphysical and religious comfort. But this is precisely 
what we must resist. […] The pragmatists exposed and sharply attacked the 
seductive but misleading appeal to absolutes, certainty, specious foundations, 
and simplistic oppositions. But their main positive achievement was to 
develop a viable critical and fallible alternative. (Bernstein, 2005, p. 26) 
This alternative can be found in the “pragmatic fallibilistic mentality”, which opposes 
dividing the moral universe into easily separable camps. It is worth mentioning that 
Bernstein’s book was published in the shadow of 9/11 and the ensuing US-led wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Envisioning global politics through the prism of a clash of 
civilisations, Bernstein demonstrates, makes it impossible to exercise the faculty of 
judgment in a nuanced manner. Pragmatists are instinctively disinclined to base 
judgments on a-historical truths about human nature. When they decide what should 
be done, they reflect and deliberate in the spirit of fallibilism, thereby acknowledging 
the openness of all inquiry and the contestability of all claims. 
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All this will sound persuasive to those who generally subscribe to the view that public 
debates should be organised in an inclusive way such that all standpoints are heard 
and none is excluded from the outset. Bernstein asks himself, though, whether the 
mentality of pragmatic fallibilism is also appropriate for dealing with evil. During the 
“War on Terror”, many politicians and commentators intimated that we would now be 
confronted with novel forms of violence that must be met with radically new policy 
measures. Indeed, the prison camp in Guantanamo Bay was explicitly designed as a 
space for extraordinary justice, outside of the protective realms of international and 
domestic law. 
What, then, can and should pragmatists say in the face of evil? The worry is, 
naturally, that their fallibilistic mentality would simply be too weak to stand up 
against extreme forms of violence. When everything is revisable and open to further 
inquiry, how could one ever reach a firm stance on highly contested questions, such 
as how alleged terrorists ought to be treated? In response to the charge that 
pragmatists are by nature indecisive, Bernstein objects: 
It is a misleading caricature of the pragmatic mentality to suggest it calls for 
endless debate. It is difficult to think of another philosophical orientation that 
has placed so much emphasis on conduct, practice, and action. There is no 
incompatibility between being decisive and recognizing the fallibility and 
limitations of our choices and decisions. On the contrary, this is what is 
required for responsible action. (Bernstein, 2005, pp. 57–58) 
In order to clarify the assertion that decisiveness and fallibility are not mutually 
exclusive, Bernstein introduces a distinction between two ways of being certain about 
something: “subjective moral certitude” and “objective moral certainty”. For 
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Bernstein, the very idea of “objective moral certainty” is profoundly flawed. 
Pragmatic fallibilism runs all the way through our motivations such that in the end we 
have no access to any form of “objective moral certainty” at all. There simply are no 
convictions, no matter how deeply felt, that could be persistently isolated from 
inquiry and critique. 
On this view, the main problem with absolutes is that they inhibit reflection and 
deliberation. Once the appeal to such an absolute is made, nothing can be said in 
response, and the discussion is over. If political actors call upon absolutes, they 
corrupt politics because their appeal to “objective moral certainty” makes any form of 
compromise impossible. Drawing a firm and impenetrable line between good and evil 
undercuts the capacity to reach out across the trenches for a settlement. Of course, 
more often than not that is precisely what appeals to absolutes are supposed to do: 
avoiding the perils of an appeasing, and perhaps rotten compromise by presenting 
one’s own position as immovable. 
Is such a generalized suspicion of absolutes internally consistent? From within the 
pragmatist tradition, an initial rejoinder might be that Bernstein’s account remains 
incompletely theorized because it conflates two senses of absolutes in politics: 
“infallible” and “without exception”. As Richard Rorty has notoriously argued, one 
may fully accept the fallibility of one’s convictions without granting that these 
convictions ought to be sacrificed in extraordinary circumstances. This is the reason, 
after all, why he calls himself a “liberal ironist” (Rorty, 1989, p. 73). Such a liberal 
ironist might thus be strongly committed to the torture prohibition, whilst 
simultaneously acknowledging the contingency and metaphysical groundlessness of 
the values underpinning the ban. Bernstein himself alludes to this possibility when he 
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insists that decisiveness and fallibility may go hand in hand; yet, he fails to specify his 
rather coarse-grained picture of absolutes further. 
Rorty is right to disambiguate the notion of an absolute. My main concern with his 
version of pragmatism, however, is that it pays insufficient attention to the social 
character of reasoning. “Liberal irony” remains very much an individual virtue, 
cultivated within the private realm (Rorty, 1989, p. 83), but with little bearing on the 
collective sphere, where “hope” would be the appropriate political attitude. 
(Koopman, 2006) Although Rorty’s programme evidently contains valuable resources 
for a pragmatist approach to the torture prohibition, his sharp distinction between 
private and public undermines its overall usefulness for our topic, and perhaps for 
political theory in general. (Haber, 1993) This is why the main inspiration for the 
following pages comes from the work of a student of Rorty’s, Robert Brandom, who 
hones in much more on the socially constructed rules by which deliberators hold each 
other accountable. 
III. Mapping the Torture Debates 
Before turning to Brandom, we need to look more closely into recent debates around 
torture. While I will exclusively focus on academic discourse, it is necessary to keep 
in mind that the current resurgence of talk about torture has been embedded in wider 
public controversies. Although it would exceed the scope of this paper to reconstruct 
the societal context of this development, it should be clear that, after 9/11, it became 
quite suddenly attractive for academics from various disciplines to openly ask 
whether torture should be considered illicit under all circumstances. In other words, it 
became possible to answer the question “when is torture right?” (McCready, 2007) 
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with a hesitant “sometimes”. (Cole and Sands, 2009; Greenberg and Dratel, 2005; 
Sands, 2008) 
It is no secret that many democracies commonly considered promoters of human 
rights have been busy developing new forms of “clean” torture. (Rejali, 2007) But 
what seems rather unique in the case of the American discussion is how much willing 
support the Bush administration received from scholarly circles, frequently through 
the introduction of hypotheticals. (Scheppele, 2005)  
Roughly speaking, two argumentative strategies were employed to weaken the 
provisions in international and US law prohibiting torture. In terms of philosophical 
doctrines from which these strategies drew inspiration, we may discern various 
traditions, from act-utilitarianism (Allhoff, 2012), to “threshold deontology” (Moore, 
1989), to rights-based reasoning (Steinhoff, 2013). However, and to complicate things 
further, it must be stressed that these philosophical doctrines are internally 
heterogeneous, which is why we can also find argument against torture grounded in 
“threshold deontology” (Kramer, 2014) as well as in consequentialism (Arrigo, 2004). 
Space constraints prevent me from engaging in detail with all these approaches. 
Therefore, this paper’s exclusive focus will lie on consequentialist arguments, and 
how one may respond to them.4 
III.a Two Argumentative Strategies Against the Ban on Torture 
The first strategy involved the suggestion to abolish the prohibition of torture tout 
court. Alan Dershowitz has been the most outspoken proponent of the idea that, in a 
liberal democracy, judges should be allowed to issue “torture warrants” in exceptional 
circumstances. (Dershowitz, 2002, pp. 132–163) The objective of these warrants 
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would be the judicial oversight of torture. Judges would then be in charge of 
rendering torture practices visible and holding interrogators accountable. Since 
interrogators would resort to torture in any case when the lives of many civilians were 
endangered, it would be prudent to grant judges the right to decide when to apply 
torture. (Dershowitz, 2003) Dershowitz, and others arguing in a similar vein, found 
that, in an era of asymmetrical warfare and counter-terrorism, a legal regulation of 
torture would simply be the lesser evil. (Moher, 2003) 
The second strategy involved the conceptual creation of a sub-category of violence 
that, while being sufficiently harsh to “break” a prisoner into submission and to 
release vital information, would still fall short of torture. This form of severe coercion 
has been called “torture lite” (see for example: Gross, 2010, p. 127). Jean Bethke 
Elshtain, a prominent defender of this notion, surmised that the word “torture” had so 
far been insufficiently disambiguated – there is a morally relevant discrepancy 
between “a beating to within an inch of one’s life” and a “slap in the face”. Bringing 
these two forms of coercion under the umbrella of “torture” would make “mincemeat 
of the category” (Elshtain, 2004, p. 79). Hence, the suggestion is to parse the 
definition of torture such that severe coercion would be exempted from the absolute 
prohibition. 
Both strategies have been met with strong criticism. The proposal that regulating 
torture through judicial oversight would be the lesser evil was discarded as a 
dangerous step towards barbarism. (Žižek, 2002, pp. 107–110) The proposition that 
some forms of severe coercion, which have hitherto been covered under the torture 
prohibition, should be tolerated in times of crisis was rejected on the ground that the 
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category of “torture lite” is nothing but a smokescreen, set up to distract the public 
from the insidiousness of torture practices. (Wolfendale, 2009) 
III.b. The Role of Absolutes in the Torture Debates 
In the course of the torture debates, the view that doing what is wrong might 
sometimes be right, and even obligatory, surfaced visibly in the context of the ticking-
bomb scenario (for a comprehensive account see: Brecher, 2007). The generic setup 
of the thought experiment is familiar: “(1) the lives of a large number of innocent 
civilians are in danger; (2) the catastrophe is imminent, therefore time is of the 
essence; (3) a terrorist has been captured who holds information that could prevent the 
catastrophe from occurring.” (Bufacchi and Arrigo, 2006, p. 358) The standard 
argument goes that, in such a situation, interrogational torture would be permissible to 
extract life-saving information from the terrorist. The underlying logic stipulates that 
the consequences of not torturing the suspect “would be horrendous, involving so 
much human suffering – death, mutilation, loss of loved ones – it must override the 
reasons, important as they may be, […] not to cause much pain and suffering to one 
single person” (Ginbar, 2008, p. 28). 
Needless to say, defenders of the hypothetical have come under attack from various 
sides. Critics have pointed out that the thought experiment is in its abstractness 
deceptive, that it leads to a slippery slope towards ethical insensitivity and that it 
remains predicated on impossible epistemological standards as regards the knowledge 
regime of the would-be torturer. (Luban, 2007; Opotow, 2007; Shue, 2006) 
The discussion around the hypothetical touches on the broader question how absolutes 
work in the torture debates. Jeremy Waldron (2011) provides us with a highly useful 
 
13 
taxonomy, outlining various responses to the consequentialist challenge. The 
rhetorical objective of the ticking-bomb scenario is clearly to encourage the absolutist 
to succumb to a “utilitarianism of extremity”: 
To meet this challenge, then, we can’t just keep coming up with better and 
better (or rather more and more horrific) characterizations of the allegedly 
forbidden act. Instead we need to explain how those who take seriously the 
alleged prohibition are to be relieved of the burden of responding to the cases 
on the other side, cases that seem to involve exactly the same concerns as 
those that motivate the absolutism. (Waldron, 2011, p. 25) 
Waldron identifies five different ways in which this challenge could be met. The first 
involves investing one’s trust into a transcendent authority who would ultimately 
assess the consequences following from an absolutist position. (Waldron, 2011, pp. 
25–29) A second way of engaging with the consequentialist challenge would be to 
argue that the costs for sticking to an absolutist position should be attributed to those 
who have caused the situation that made resorting to a “lesser evil” appear inevitable. 
Accordingly, choosing not to torture might lead to innumerable deaths in the “ticking 
bomb” scenario – but it is, in the last instance, the terrorist who shoulders the 
responsibility for the ensuing carnage. 
A third possibility to justify the absolutist position involves the notion that any state 
of affairs resulting from an immoral act, such as torturing, would be fatally “tainted” 
by this very act. When the state permits torture in order to protect its citizenry, the 
gained protection is problematic from the outset because it builds on some primordial 
violence. Fourthly, Waldron suggests that an absolutist could appeal to the rules of a 
game as being prior to the goals to be achieved through playing the game. (Waldron, 
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2011, p. 35) He shows that, on this defence of absolutes, any deviation from the rules 
for the purpose of achieving societal goals would fatally undermine the way the game 
is played. Making an exception for torture in exceptional circumstances changes the 
game altogether, on this account. Waldron calls the final riposte to the 
consequentialist challenge “threshold deontology”. The threshold deontologist accepts 
the importance of moral absolutes – up to a certain point. In extreme situations, the 
argument goes, we are required to recur to utilitarian calculations that would override 
rights-based constraints on political action. (Waldron, 2011, p. 40) 
Waldron provides us with diagnostic tools for screening the diverse arsenal of 
consequentialist arguments. Yet, it comes as little surprise that a genuine line of 
defence is amiss in this taxonomy. One conclusion I would like to draw – one that 
Waldron himself does not share, though – is that defending the ban on torture on 
deontological grounds is bound to fail once we allow consequentialists to pursue their 
agenda, by designing thought experiments against which the absolutist must 
necessarily appear feeble. So, instead of permitting the conjurer of thought 
experiments to set the terms of the discussion, it might be more prudent to stress the 
context in which the torture debates have been taking place. This is the purpose of the 
next section. 
IV. Towards a Critical Embrace of Constitutive Rules of Reasoning 
Everything discussed so far appears to indicate that pragmatists must side with those 
who argue that torture cannot be prohibited under all circumstances. At first sight, it 
seems that the injunction against absolutes in the political forum is completely 
incompatible with a ban on torture. There is something to be said in favour of this 
assessment; yet, I would like to resist it by attempting to propose a different route 
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towards supporting the torture prohibition, one that is consonant with pragmatism’s 
fallible as well as anti-sceptical stance. To sustain this claim, I shall demonstrate that 
the principles underlying the ban on torture can be conceived of in a manner different 
from Bernstein’s: not as transcendental norms that defy discussion and revision, but 
as normative commitments that are deeply embedded in the cultural and social 
practices of liberal democracy. 
I start by revisiting Robert Brandom’s work, which offers a persuasive alternative to 
Bernstein’s account of absolutes. (Brandom, 1994, 2000, 2009, 2010) Brandom builds 
in many ways on the heritage of American pragmatism, whilst significantly 
transforming the research programme outlined in section II. His approach to 
semantics is pragmatist: he believes it is possible to elucidate the meaning of words 
by looking at the practices of competent language-users. Brandom sets his view apart 
from a representational one, according to which the conceptual content of words is 
established independently of their use. This method involves describing assertions 
first and foremost as social activities. Brandom emphasizes the rational character of 
these activities when he highlights that any discourse has at its core the “game of 
giving and asking for reasons” (Brandom, 1994, p. xviii). Thus, Brandom’s 
understanding of rationality is interactive and dialogical. Reasoning is a social 
practice with a normative impetus. To raise a claim in a conversation implies entering 
into the game of reasoning – the partners in discourse can assess and challenge the 
claim, or offer a countervailing claim. 
All this will sound familiar to those acquainted with the basic structure of deliberative 
theories of democracy. But Brandom departs from these theories when he tries to 
make the normative character of discursive practices explicit. He distinguishes 
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between two kinds of normative status: commitment and entitlement. Being 
committed or entitled to something is a social activity that only makes sense to the 
extent that discourse partners recognize these normative statuses. Here, Brandom 
vehemently rejects the idea that commitments or entitlements could be held in the 
absence of actual relationships between discourse partners. Once again the dialogical 
and interactive character of normativity comes to the fore, as the following passage 
shows: 
There were no commitments before people started treating each other as 
committed; they are not part of the natural furniture of the world. Rather they 
are social statuses, instituted by individuals attributing such statuses to each 
other, recognizing or acknowledging those statuses. (Brandom, 1994, p. 161) 
From this passage it should be evident that Brandom paints a thoroughly social 
picture of normativity. Language use in general can then be characterized as involving 
this “game of giving and taking of reasons”. 
Does this model contain resources for criticizing normative statuses? Given that 
pragmatists grant priority to practices, the doubt may indeed arise whether one can 
ever stand outside those practices in order to transform them. Brandom certainly 
seems to insinuate that we cannot leave the game of reasoning behind – we cannot 
simply step outside of those practices we share with other reasoners. Does this force 
us to accept a form of “conventionalism” about norms, whereby the mere existence of 
a practice is proof of an underlying norm? 
It is possible to debunk this assumption by demonstrating that all discourses occur 
within a web of intersecting social practices. (Fossen, 2012) This implies that we may 
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draw on resources from within the practices we are engaged in to revise existing 
norms. While pragmatists argue that it is impossible to call into question all beliefs at 
the same time (hence their anti-skepticism), they are equally convinced that social 
practices are revisable through immanent criticism. 
Brandom’s view of reasoning thus shares many features with Bernstein’s account of 
pragmatic fallibilism. Where he departs from Bernstein’s position is in the elaborate 
and sophisticated account of the process of giving and taking of reasons. This process 
makes it possible to assign responsibility to those who are entangled with each other 
in the game of reasoning. This entanglement makes critique and transformation 
possible: it is precisely because we can hold each other accountable for the positions 
we take that we are able to change our standpoints. 
IV.a Constitutive Rules and the Liberalism of Fear 
In what ways, then, does this conception of pragmatism relate to the torture debates? 
Brandom’s approach to normativity is important because it emphasizes the social 
activity of reasoning, which could not be played out without some binding rules 
governing the contest between reasoners. If we start from pragmatist premises, the 
prohibition’s purpose is to sustain and affirm normative commitments, whose stability 
is central to reflection and deliberation. Reasoners, in Brandom’s sense, are in need of 
banisters that guide their discourses when they engage with each other; but these are 
adjustable banisters in that they reflect historically and culturally contingent 
principles that remain altogether accessible to future revisions. 
The proposal is, hence, to re-interpret the ban on torture as a rule of reasoning, rather 
than as an absolute. To construe the torture prohibition as a “rule” signals its potential 
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revisability, whilst at the same time stressing its robust nature. What exactly do I 
mean by “rule” in this context, more concretely? To further clarify, let us distinguish 
between two types of rule in social interactions. Regulative rules apply in situations 
where a practice exists independently from the rules that govern it.5 (Searle, 1969, pp. 
35–37) Constitutive rules, on the other hand, apply in situations where the rules 
themselves create the practice they govern. Chess is a typical case of a game whose 
rules are constitutive. Whereas the rules of chess also dictate the behaviour of the 
players, they do more than mere regulation – without them there would be no game 
we call chess. Applying this distinction to the torture debates, my argument is that the 
ban on torture must be considered a constitutive rule governing the game we call 
“liberal democracy”. The ban articulates a norm whose existence is necessary for, and 
foundational to, liberal democracy. 
Space constraints prevent me from painting a complete picture of “liberal 
democracy”, but a few basic features need to be outlined. One promising way of 
characterizing liberal democracy is to envisage rights as “trumps” that countervail 
majoritarian decisions generated through democratic procedures. (Dworkin, 2009) 
Today, this is a widely held interpretation of democracy itself – that the will of the 
majority must be constrained by laws that lie beyond the will of the majority. (Talisse, 
2007, p. 29) The problem with this interpretation, however, is that the image of 
“trumps” has connotations that are inimical to the fallibilistic mentality sketched 
above. Hence, pragmatists cannot espouse this rights-based reading of liberal 
democracy: a “trump” is just another word for an absolute, after all.6 
If a “rights-as-trumps” understanding of liberal democracy seems inopportune from 
the point of view of pragmatism, what other options do we have? A more auspicious 
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perspective would be to draw on the notion of a “liberalism of fear”. (Shklar, 1982) 
On this account, liberalism should primarily be seen as a project of avoiding and 
containing fear, “which is created by arbitrary, unexpected, unnecessary, and 
unlicensed acts of force and by habitual and pervasive acts of cruelty and torture 
performed by military, paramilitary, and police agents in any regime” (Shklar, 1989, 
p. 29). 
Cruelty as the summum malum of liberalism does not necessarily prepare the ground 
for a social project in the broader sense; it merely enunciates a “first principle, an act 
of moral intuition based on ample observation, on which liberalism can be built” 
(Shklar, 1989, p. 30). The advantage of this parsimonious account of liberalism is its 
“thinness”: instead of proclaiming a list of inviolable goods, such as dignity, it posits 
avoiding fear as a pre-condition for living a dignified life. The fear of systematic 
cruelty is such a universally shared practice among human beings that it requires 
little, or perhaps even no argument at all, to justify it.7 
Against the backdrop of such a parsimonious image of liberal democracy, it becomes 
clear what is at stake in the torture debates: the essence of a culture rooted in the fear 
of cruelty. Viewed from this angle, the debate about the prohibition of torture looks 
rather different from how Waldron envisaged it – it turns around an essential feature 
of liberal democracy, the elimination of which would render the very phrase “liberal 
democracy” meaningless. 
While one might object that torturing suspected terrorists can in fact enhance the 
sense of safety enjoyed by the citizenry – after all, a threat might be averted through 
the interrogation – this rejoinder fails to properly conceive of the relationship between 
the torture prohibition and the liberalism of fear. When someone is tortured, pain is 
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deliberately inflicted so as to break his or her spirit, presumably to release vital 
information that might prevent much larger harm. The victim of torture becomes 
dominated in such a way that his or her dignity is entirely obliterated. Torture as 
extreme domination is therefore different from ordinary coercion, where the subject’s 
agency remains intact (Wisnewski, 2010, p. 64). Or, to put it otherwise, “[t]orture […] 
is a microcosm, raised to the highest level of intensity, of the tyrannical political 
relationships that liberalism hates the most.” (Luban, 2007, p. 251)8  
By tying the ban on torture to the liberalism of fear, I do not wish to suggest that 
actually existing liberal democracies would instinctively shy away from torture. On 
the contrary, if anything is to be learnt from recent revelations about the vast scale of 
abuse in US detention centres, it is surely that the torture prohibition has been much 
less robust than one would have hoped. My argument is, rather, that subverting the 
ban on torture ultimately leads to the disintegration of the very culture that forms the 
basis of liberal democracy. 
Here, the analogy with playing a game governed by constitutive rules is illuminating. 
When players start to persistently ignore and break the rules of a given game, this 
may trigger a general demise in how the game is perceived. Viewed from this vantage 
point, it becomes clearer that the torture prohibition cannot be presented in isolation 
from other social practices that together form a web in which reflection and 
deliberation occur. 
This idea has implications for how we assess the consequentialist challenge with 
which we saw Waldron grappling. The crucial move of the consequentialist critics is 
to decontextualize the torture prohibition such that the decision whether to resort to 
torture becomes a singular, and even tragic-heroic act: the ticking-bomb scenario is 
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the paradigmatic case of a hypothetical in which the lives of innumerable innocent 
people depend on an agent’s willingness to perform an isolated horrific deed. As such, 
it presents us with an extreme case of short-termism where the utilitarian calculus 
applies solely to the one moment of interrogational torture – the long-term effects of 
abolishing the torture prohibition, however, do not figure in the debate. (Arrigo, 2004; 
McDonald, 2010; Wolfendale, 2006) 
Once we acknowledge the centrality of the torture ban for the liberalism of fear, it 
transpires that it is the defenders of the ticking-bomb scenario who are trying to 
control the debate: such thought experiments intend to make a nuanced discussion 
impossible – anything but torturing the terrorist in the face of such overwhelming loss 
of innocent lives must appear frivolous. In a significant sense, the consequentialist 
challenge is thus manipulative: deliberately or not, it calls into question, and 
ultimately demolishes, commitments that are deeply embedded in the political culture 
of liberal democracies. (Fried, 2014) 
When claiming that the ticking-bomb scenario is problematic in that it negatively 
affects our ability to reflect and deliberate, I do not mean to suggest that the academic 
debate about this hypothetical has stalled. On the contrary, very few topics in recent 
years have received as much attention in political theory as the ticking-bomb 
scenario.9 Evidently, there has been an expansion of discourses around the thought 
experiment and its various incarnations. However, my interest in this imaginary case 
is normative rather than sociological. In other words, I want to raise the question 
whether the widespread use of the ticking-bomb scenario has led to an impoverishing 
of our ethical frameworks, echoing Henry Shue’s poignant observation that “artificial 
cases make bad ethics” (Shue, 1978, p. 141). Once we highlight the effects – whether 
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intended or not – that the thought experiment may have on its audience, we get a 
better grasp on its controversial nature. 
In sum, this section has demonstrated that Brandom’s view of reasoning can provide 
us with a different perspective on the torture prohibition. By foregrounding the 
necessity of constitutive rules of reasoning, we are able to construe the ban on torture 
as a necessary pillar of the game we call “liberal democracy. This view is markedly 
different from the standard deontological reference to inviolable goods in that it 
recognizes the rules’ revisability. 
IV.b. Potential Objections 
Before concluding, I need to examine several objections that can be raised against the 
arguments defended in this paper. The first objection is to do with the evolution of 
rules. One could submit that rules are never set in stone, and that it lies in the nature 
of a pragmatist account of reasoning that the contenders are permanently involved in 
the re-negotiation of the rules. One reason why contenders would want to do so is that 
new possibilities for playing better must be explored. All types of sport undergo such 
creative changes. (McFee, 2004) Why, then, should we refrain from considering the 
ban on torture along the lines of Elshtain’s attempt to analytically dissect forms of 
severe coercion?  
In response, the Brandomian pragmatist would concede that changing the rules of 
reasoning is possible and often necessary, but changes can only be instituted through 
processes of immanent critique. Naming some forms of severe coercion “torture lite” 
might be charitably interpreted as an effort to initiate such a critique of existing 
definitions of torture. 
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But it is striking that very few participants in the debate have been swayed by the 
proposals of torture apologists, and those who enthusiastically supported the War on 
Terror, and its security agenda, rather abruptly changed course once they became 
aware of what enhanced interrogation techniques, such as waterboarding, actually 
entailed. (Hitchens, 2008) What is more, a recent psychological study of the lasting 
effects of “torture lite” has proven that these presumably less violent techniques do 
“not seem to be substantially different from physical torture in terms of the severity of 
mental suffering they cause, the underlying mechanism of traumatic stress, and their 
long-term psychological outcome” (Başoğlu, Livanou, and Crnobarić, 2007, p. 277). 
So, on the most charitable interpretation, we might acknowledge that some (yet not 
all) apologists were merely engaged in a bona fide act of redescription. But given our 
current knowledge about the impact of enhanced interrogation techniques, we must 
surely accept that the very notion of “torture lite” is a myth, and nothing else. 
(Wolfendale, 2009) 
The second objection relates to the spectre of relativism. If reasoning is a social 
activity whose practices are bound up with a community’s customs and mores, it 
remains unclear, a critic might contend, how the reasoners ought to relate to those 
who are not members of the community. This objection is particularly poignant with 
regard to the prohibition of torture: what value does it have if it only applies to a 
specific group of people, united by a commitment to the liberalism of fear? The 
notion of “constitutive rules of reasoning” defended in this paper indeed presupposes 
a web of shared practices, which binds together a liberal-democratic community of 
reasoners. This makes it by default impossible to appeal to such a rule when dealing 
with those with whom no practices are shared. 
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But for the case of the torture debates this “primacy of practice” is perhaps less 
problematic than it might appear, because it emphasizes the robustness of rules within 
a community. While the torture prohibition is relativized through my critique of 
absolutes, the rules of the liberal-democratic game are internally binding. Let us also 
recall that the torture debates, as reconstructed in section III, took place entirely 
between parties that all subscribed to the notion that liberal democracy should not be 
abandoned. None of the participants in the torture debate suggested that the US, or 
any other country fighting in the “War on Terror”, should forego its credentials as a 
beacon of freedom and democracy. On the contrary, what commentators like 
Dershowitz submitted was that it would sometimes be imperative to use torture in 
order to safeguard freedom and democracy. This paper has demonstrated that the 
corrosive effects of allowing torture would in fact lead to the destruction of the very 
culture underlying liberal democracy. 
This means that, while my argument has indeed been grounded in a specific belief 
system geared towards the avoidance of fear, there is no reason to suspect that other 
justificatory strategies would necessarily have to fail, or yield less persuasive 
outcomes. While I am convinced that the liberalism of fear lends itself particularly 
well to the project of upholding the torture prohibition, the framework developed in 
this paper could undoubtedly be extended to also include narratives stemming from 
different cultural traditions. (see for example: Twiss, 2007) 
The third objection is about the efficacy of the argument. A sceptic might be tempted 
to retort that my point about constitutive rules of reasoning is ultimately misdirected. 
To accuse torture apologists of “breaking the rules” seems understated, to put it 
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mildly. It would be more effective to call torture apologists something harsher, to 
reflect the severity of their transgressions. 
In response, the pragmatist could reiterate that the defence of the ban on torture is an 
indirect one. It simply states that torture apologists “want to have their cake and eat it 
too” – that is, they intend to remain devoted to the game we call “liberal democracy”, 
while vigorously attacking one of its constitutive rules. Indirectly, the argument about 
rule-following can thus be useful in discrediting the symbolic support that the US 
administration’s policy decisions received from academics. 
A fourth and final objection would target the paper’s position on a meta-level as 
regards the torture debates. After all, much more “practical” arguments around 
torture, often based on rational-choice and game-theoretical frameworks, have been 
circulating as well. (Koppl, 2006; Schiemann, 2012) Perhaps the most influential of 
these arguments has been that, as an information-gathering technique, torture simply 
works (Franklin, 2009; for a critical analysis see: Hajjar, 2009). In Guantanamo Bay, 
for example, psychologists assisted the military personnel in the interrogations of 
suspected terrorists, as members of so-called Behavioural Science Consultation 
Teams. (McCoy, 2012, pp. 82–84) Over the past years, it has become known that 
these psychologists offered their vast expertise to force detainees at Guantanamo into 
complete submission, for example via the induction of “learned helplessness”. (Risen, 
2014, pp. 192–193) 
What has been absent in these discussions around the effectiveness of torture is, 
obviously, a deeper concern with the moral dimension of “intentionally inflicting 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental”, as Article 1(1) of the 
Convention Against Torture defines it. At most, interrogators and their political 
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superiors have been worried about legal liability at home or abroad, an issue that 
remains undecided until today. (Teitel, 2011, pp. 60–61) Since this paper has been 
primarily interested in the normative debate around the permissibility of torture, such 
“practical” arguments – does torture work, and if yes, how? – must be denounced as 
inherently problematic. In response to the objection, I would thus argue that the 
pragmatist defence indeed occurs on a meta-level compared to these practical 
arguments, but this is exactly where the contestation of the “torture works”-narrative 
must take place. 
To conclude, this paper has shown that, on a particular reading of pragmatism, it is 
possible to defend a ban of torture. By distinguishing between constitutive and 
regulative rules, the paper has sought to offer support to those who find the absolutist 
response to the consequentialist challenge unsatisfying, but still want to uphold the 
torture prohibition. This line of defence is manifestly limited in its scope: it does not 
pretend to offer a justification for the wider web of social practices that together 
constitute the game we call “liberal democracy”. Whether and how this game could 
be justified is a question I have not ventured to answer here, even though I have 
hinted at Judith’s Shklar’s idea of putting cruelty first as a possible point of departure. 
Yet, if we consider ourselves committed to liberal democracy, it would be 
irresponsible to compel those with whom we hope to have a conversation to accept 
torture as an acceptable move in the conversation. 
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the so-called “Copenhagen School”, such as Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, have for 
some time argued that securitizing certain issues involves depoliticizing them – by 
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Extraordinary individuals, such as Frankel, might be able to salvage their lives 
through their resilient spirit, but the same cannot be expected from every human 
being. What Shklar claims, however, is that a society prizing dignity as a foundational 
social value cannot be made compatible with the existence of widespread fear.  
9 This has led some to argue that “by providing rhetorical resources to those who 
would, for example, create a network of secret prisons beyond the rule of law in 
which to torture anyone unfortunate enough to have crossed one of their informants, 
political philosophers […] have foreseeably made not only each of the violations 
committed in those facilities easier but also facilitated the corruption of the various 
political institutions implicated in those practices” (Jubb and Kurtulmus, 2012, pp. 
539–540). 
